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RUSSIA AND THE NEWS MEDIA IN 
UKRAINE: A CASE OF ‘SOFT POWER’? 
 
ABSTRACT: The mass media are closely associated with the concept of ‘soft power’. In Russia, 
as in the West, politicians believe that favorable foreign media coverage can facilitate their 
foreign policy success. This article considers news coverage of Russia in Ukraine, a geopolitically 
important state where Russian ‘news exporters’ have been a prominent feature of the media 
landscape in recent years. Using content analysis and original interviews with editorial staff, the 
article reveals factors which shaped reporting about Russia in Ukraine in 2010–2011. It 
demonstrates that news providers in Ukraine which had a Russian shareholder or partner 
tended to be more restrained in their criticism of Russia than comparable news providers 
without such Moscow connections. Yet it also reveals diversity among Russia’s news exporters: 
some clearly served Kremlin interests, while others were commercially driven and balanced 
demands from Moscow against the demands of their audience. The findings are relevant to 
assessments of Russian regional influence, as they highlight opportunities and challenges facing 
the Kremlin in its aspiration to secure an advantage from ‘Russian’ media operating in the post-
Soviet republics. More broadly, this article questions whether the conceptual framework of ‘soft 
power’ is adequate to capture the complexities of Russian involvement in Ukraine’s media 
environment.  
WORD COUNT: 9,300, or 11,000 including abstract and endnotes.  
The mass media are closely associated with the concept of ‘soft power’ in international 
relations. Joseph Nye states that ‘information is power’ and that success in the information age 
depends not only on whose army wins, but on ‘whose story wins’.1 As the idea of soft power has 
caught on in policy-making circles around the world, so governments have come to believe in 
the media’s potential to affect their nations’ success in the international arena. It is thought that 
the media shape foreign public sentiments, which in turn affect the acquiescence or resistance 
of foreign elites to particular foreign policy goals. The validity of this assumption is very hard to 
test. Nevertheless, states are devoting considerable resources to reaching foreign publics via the 
media, hoping thereby to improve their chances of obtaining positive results in international 
affairs. 
Russia has joined the soft power bandwagon. In 2011 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov 
declared that it was ‘impossible’ to effectively defend national interests ‘without proper use of 
solid soft power resources’.2 The Russian Foreign Policy Concepts of 2008 and 2013 included 
pledges to ‘develop effective means of information influence on public opinion abroad’.3 TV 
channels and publications with Russian shareholders or partners are available and often 
popular in many post-Soviet countries. However, researchers have so far paid little attention to 
the dynamics of Russian involvement in other states’ media landscapes across the post-Soviet 
region. Most existing studies of post-Soviet journalism are written from a single-country 
perspective and focus on domestic issues, such as state control of the media;4 concentration of 
ownership;5 or the power/impotence of media during elections.6 Meanwhile, the literature on 
Russian foreign policy has tended to attach the soft power label to the Russian mass media 
indiscriminately without scrutinizing their transnational operations in any depth.7 
This article explores Russian influence on news content in Ukraine through a comparative study 
of 14 leading Russian-language news providers, some of which had Russian shareholders or 
partners while others did not. Content samples are analyzed to expose how Russia was 
portrayed by the 14 news providers over a four-month period in 2010. The content findings are 
then explained by 28 original interviews with journalists, editors and media professionals. The 
interviews shed light on factors which shaped reporting about Russia in Ukraine during the 
period under study, including the impact on content of Russian capital or commercial links. The 
empirical evidence presented here indicates that news providers in Ukraine which have a 
Russian shareholder or partner do tend to be more restrained in their criticism of Russia than 
comparable news providers without such Moscow connections. Some of the media studied 
generated tendentious coverage of Russia which flattered the Russian authorities. 
At the same time, however, this article questions whether the conceptual framework of ‘soft 
power’ is adequate to capture the complexities of Russian involvement in Ukraine’s media 
environment. The study reveals diversity among the ‘Russian’ news providers operating in 
Ukraine: some clearly served Kremlin interests, but others were motivated by commercial 
considerations so their journalists were balancing demands from Moscow alongside the 
demands of their audience. Indiscriminate application of the ‘soft power’ label risks obscuring 
this diversity and vulnerability to local constraints. A further problem brought out in the 
concluding discussion is that Russia’s most pro-Kremlin news exporters have demonstrated a 
considerable capacity to provoke, which may be equally significant for Moscow-Kyiv relations 
as their capacity to ‘softly’ attract and persuade a mass audience, if not more so. 
CONCEPTUALIZING ‘SOFT POWER’ 
In one recent book Nye defines soft power as ‘the ability to affect others through the co-optive 
means of framing the agenda, persuading and eliciting positive attraction in order to obtain 
preferred outcomes.’8 A state’s soft power, according to Nye, comes principally from its culture, 
political values and foreign policy. These three resources (and others) can be turned into soft 
power by ‘skilful conversion strategies’ which may involve public diplomacy and various other 
tools. 
Scholarly reaction to the idea of soft power has been mixed. There is now a sizeable academic 
literature addressing the soft power of China, the USA, Japan and Venezuela, inter alia 
(substantive studies of soft power in the post-Soviet region are not numerous, but are beginning 
to emerge).9 Yet Nye’s concept has been criticized for several major weaknesses. Besides the 
practical difficulty of drawing a clear line between power that is ‘hard’ and power that is ‘soft’ 
(e.g. material wealth can coerce and coopt simultaneously), there is a problematic conflation of 
distinct understandings of power through attraction in Nye’s work. 10  On the one hand, he 
implies that attractive power occurs as a natural by-product of a country’s culture, values and 
policies which hold inherent appeal for particular subjects. Edward Lock calls this ‘structural’ 
power because the power is not strictly possessed by an agent; rather, it resides in social 
structures such as shared norms or values.11 On the other hand, Nye implies that soft power can 
be ‘produced’ by a country investing in broadcasting and public diplomacy. He describes Al 
Jazeera as a ‘soft power resource’,12 not because the TV channel holds attraction for others but 
because it can transmit messages and frame issues. This understanding of soft power is very 
agent-centric. Desired outcomes are achieved through communication – wielders of soft power 
persuade subjects to change their values and priorities, rather than exploiting values and 
priorities which are already shared. Lock calls this ‘relational’ power, as the power exists within 
the context of a relationship between actors. 
Because he does not differentiate systematically between these two mechanisms of attraction, 
Nye’s exposition of soft power has been described as ‘maddeningly inconsistent’.13 We still lack 
a coherent theory of soft power to clarify its causal mechanisms and the part played by the 
media (Nye himself says that soft power is ‘an analytical concept, not a theory’).14 Further 
problems lie in the formidable challenge of establishing soft power’s effectiveness empirically. 
On the whole, scholars have limited themselves to describing what countries do under the 
banner of soft power; they have not assessed the impact of such activity on the outcomes of 
foreign policy. As things stand, it might be most accurate to define soft power as a label 
signifying actions undertaken by states in the hope of influencing opinions abroad, in the hope 
that by doing so their chances of foreign policy success will improve. 
Despite these conceptual, theoretical and empirical concerns, soft power is a topic which cannot 
be ignored, not least because of the traction it has gained among governments. The term soft 
power (myagkaya sila) has been incorporated into Russian foreign policy: the Foreign Policy 
Concept adopted by President Putin in February 2013 describes it as ‘an indispensable 
component of modern international relations’.15 Russia favors the agent-centric view of soft 
power. The Foreign Policy Concept stresses a state-led approach rather than letting Russian 
culture, values and policies elicit attraction by themselves. Explicit goals in the Concept which 
fall broadly under the soft power umbrella include promoting use of the Russian language, 
boosting the international role of Russian NGOs and strengthening the position of the Russian 
mass media on the global stage. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is the focus of 
particular attention – the ‘common cultural and civilizational heritage’ of the CIS states is to be 
‘preserved and augmented’, while Ukraine is to be involved in ‘extended integration processes’, 
such as Putin’s project for a Eurasian Union.16 This reflects the rise of Russian ‘Civilizational’ 
discourse in recent years.17 ‘Civilizationalists’ emphasize the distinctiveness of Russia’s culture 
and values and its responsibility to protect and unify those with whom it has historical ties. 
Russian-speakers in neighboring states are considered ‘compatriots’ (sootechestvenniki), whose 
‘educational, linguistic, social, labor, humanitarian, and other rights’ Russia must protect.18 In 
Ukraine, where attitudes toward Russia vary substantially along a much studied East-West 
divide,19 Russia’s ‘Civilizational’ ambitions and ‘soft power’ policies are perceived by many as a 
threat to sovereignty and national identity. 
This article does not assess the overall effectiveness of Russia’s ‘soft power strategy’ in Ukraine, 
nor even the effectiveness of its media component. To do so, one would need to establish the 
impact of Russian public diplomacy efforts and media messages on Ukrainian public opinion, 
before tracing the impact of public opinion on foreign policy outcomes – both resource-
intensive tasks replete with methodological difficulties. The primary aim here is rather to 
scrutinize the behavior of various ‘Russian’ news media in Ukraine, i.e. news media with Russian 
shareholders or partners, and explore whether – on the basis of their content and editorial 
policies – they deserve to be labelled so widely and indiscriminately as soft power resources for 
the Kremlin. The findings relate not only to Russian state TV channels available in Ukraine 
(whose pro-Kremlin loyalties are not disputed) but also to popular newspapers. Some of the 
latter are subject to complex and conflicting influences (domestic vs. international), for which 
the soft power framework fails to account. At times, Russian TV channels have generated 
political scandals in Ukraine which fit uneasily with the soft power idea of eliciting positive 
attraction. Thus, this article does not set out to test the association between Russian media and 
soft power so much as to unpack and challenge assumptions and generalizations on which the 
association rests. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. First, Russian involvement in the Ukrainian 
market for news is described and contextualized. Next, the methods and data used in the study 
are explained, before presentation of the results in separate sections on TV news bulletins and 
newspapers. Finally, the article reflects briefly on the potential of Russian news exports to 
provoke as well as attract, highlighting the need for a more nuanced view of the role played by 
Russian transnational news media in regional political dynamics.   
UKRAINE’S MEDIA LANDSCAPE AND RUSSIAN NEWS EXPORTS 
For the past two decades the Ukrainian media environment has been pluralistic and far from 
transparent, reflecting the nature of Ukrainian politics. As things stood in 2013, all the most 
popular TV channels and mass-circulation publications belonged to rival privately-owned 
financial groups, ultimately controlled by Ukrainian ‘oligarchs’.  The big five media holdings 
were Inter Media (uaimg.com), 1+1 Media (media.1plus1.ua), Media Group Ukraine 
(mgukraine.com), StarLightMedia (www.starlightmedia.ua) and Ukrainian Media Holding 
(www.umh.com.ua). Inter Media belonged to gas tycoon Dmytro Firtash and head of the 
Ukrainian Presidential Administration Serhiy Lyovochkin; 1+1 Media was owned by 
multibillionaire businessman Ihor Kolomoyskyy; Media Group Ukraine belonged to 
multibillionaire businessman Rinat Akhmetov; StarLightMedia was owned by multibillionaire 
businessman Viktor Pinchuk; while Ukrainian Media Holding was the property of young 
multimillionaire Serhiy Kurchenko.20 
Several major media assets changed hands in 2013, prompting observers to speculate that the 
so-called ‘Family’ of President Viktor Yanukovych was establishing a propaganda arsenal in 
preparation for the 2015 presidential election.21 Yet Yanukovych never managed to secure 
monopolistic control over the Ukrainian media. The balance of power between Ukrainian media 
moguls and the Ukrainian president has generally been less one-sided than the balance of 
power between Russian media moguls and Russian President Vladimir Putin; their allegiance 
has not been quite so reliable. It is not unknown for Ukrainian tycoons to switch political sides 
(e.g. Kolomoyskyy’s vacillating support for Yuliya Tymoshenko in 2008–09) or encourage their 
media to adopt a balanced stance (as Inter’s former owner Valeriy Khoroshkovskyy did in late 
2012).22 Ukraine has also had numerous media organizations with somewhat smaller audiences 
which pursue an independent or critical line (e.g. newspapers Zerkalo Nedeli / Dzerkalo Tyzhnia, 
Den, and Kommentarii; the magazine Ukrainskiy Tyzhden; the website Ukrainska Pravda and 
cable TV channel TVi).23 
When it comes to following the news, Ukraine is a nation of TV viewers. A survey conducted in 
November 2011 found that 94 per cent of Ukrainians used TV as a source of news every day or 
most days. This compares to 31 per cent who used radio; 30 per cent who used newspapers; 22 
per cent who used the internet and 6 per cent who used magazines.24 In fall 2013 Ukraine’s 
most-watched news programs were Podrobnosti on Inter (part of Inter Media) and TSN on 1+1 
(part of 1+1 Media). Each had a daily rating around 7–8 per cent, which equates to roughly three 
million viewers.25 The other news bulletins with over a million daily viewers were Vikna-Novini 
on STB (part of StarLightMedia); Fakty on ICTV (also part of StarLightMedia) and Sobytiya on 
Ukraina (part of Media Group Ukraine). Few newspapers had readerships to compete with the 
audiences of the TV news bulletins. The exceptions were the mass-circulation dailies Segodnya 
(Media Group Ukraine); Fakty (StarLightMedia) and Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine 
(Ukrainian Media Holding), along with the weekly paper Argumenty i Fakty v Ukraine (Ukrainian 
Media Holding). In 2012 Argumenty i Fakty v Ukraine reported a per-issue readership of 1.6 
million,26 while the three dailies reported per-issue readerships of 1.3 million, 1.1 million and 
0.8 million respectively (it should be borne in mind that there is no independent monitoring of 
Ukrainian newspaper circulations, so these data may be somewhat inflated for marketing 
reasons).27 The press has been losing ground to the internet for years,28 but most of Ukraine’s 
leading off-line news providers have become major online players too. 
In recent years Russian news exporters and Russian capital have occupied a very visible 
position within this Ukrainian media environment. Two of the mass-circulation publications 
mentioned above – Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine and Argumenty i Fakty v Ukraine – are 
Ukrainian editions of Moscow-based publications. They are run as franchises; some of their 
content is written by staff in Russia and some is produced locally in Ukraine. The broadsheet 
Izvestiya v Ukraine (1+1 Media) followed a similar model until its closure in 2013.29 Another 
well-known Russian newspaper with a prominent Ukrainian presence was the business daily 
Kommersant, which launched Kommersant-Ukraina in 2005. Like its parent publication, 
Kommersant-Ukraina was owned by Russian tycoon Alisher Usmanov until it ceased operation 
in 2014.30 Kommersant-Ukraina took relatively little content from Moscow. Over 80 per cent of 
the paper was produced by staff in Kyiv.31 
TV news bulletins from Russia’s main federal broadcasters are available in Ukraine via satellite 
and cable. During the period under study their potential reach was substantial, particularly in 
urban areas where cable is the most widespread means of television reception. One 2011 
survey found that the international streams of the three biggest Russian state-controlled TV 
channels, Pervyy Kanal, RTR Planeta and NTV Mir, were viewed weekly by 32.8 per cent, 24.9 
per cent and 19.8 per cent of the Ukrainian population, respectively.32 Yet entertainment 
programs on the Russian channels seem to attract more viewers than news and current affairs. 
In 2010, 8 per cent of survey respondents said they watched news and current affairs on Pervyy 
Kanal, while the figures for RTR Planeta and NTV Mir were 6 and 5 per cent respectively.33 In 
contrast, Inter’s news and current affairs output was watched by almost two thirds of survey 
participants. Another survey from 2011 found that 12 per cent of Ukrainians named Russia’s 
Pervyy Kanal among their top three sources of information, while fewer than 1 per cent of 
respondents named RTR-Planeta and NTV Mir.34 In contrast, Ukrainian channels 1+1 and Inter 
were named by 60 per cent and 58 per cent of respondents respectively. 
This overview of Russian involvement in Ukraine’s media environment is not comprehensive; it 
is primarily intended to provide background information about the news providers analyzed 
below. The focus in this article is on high-profile TV news bulletins and newspapers available 
nationwide in Ukraine, so radio, the internet and non-news entertainment media are not 
discussed here, nor is Russian media involvement at the sub-national level. 
INVESTIGATING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE ON NEWS: METHODS AND DATA 
In order to assess Russian influence on news content in Ukraine, 14 news providers were 
studied and compared: 
• three nightly news bulletins: Podrobnosti on Inter; Sobytiya on TRK Ukraina; Vremya on 
Russia’s Pervyy Kanal; 
• three daily tabloids: Segodnya; Fakty i Kommentarii; Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine; 
• three daily broadsheets: Den; Kommersant-Ukraina; Izvestiya v Ukraine; 
• five weekly newspapers: mass circulation Argumenty i Fakty v Ukraine; broadsheets 
Zerkalo Nedeli and 2000; Berliner-format Stolichnyye Novosti and Kommentarii 
During the period under study all these news providers were available nationwide in Ukraine; 
published or broadcast in Russian;35 and were well-known (the newspapers reported weekly 
print-runs over 50,000 and the TV bulletins came from channels that fell within the national top 
10 at the start of the study). Six of the 14 news providers had a shareholder or partner in 
Russia: Pervyy Kanal belonged to the Russian state; Inter had a minority Russian shareholder (a 
29 per cent stake in Inter is owned by Pervyy Kanal);36 Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine, 
Izvestiya v Ukraine and Argumenty i Fakty v Ukraine all had Russian franchisors; while 
Kommersant-Ukraina was fully owned by Russian tycoon Alisher Usmanov. The other eight 
news providers did not have any visible organizational links to Moscow. This case selection 
made it possible to investigate the hypothesis that a news provider with a shareholder or partner 
in Russia is likely to generate (a) more extensive and (b) more favorable coverage of Russia than 
market rivals because of its Russian connections. The research strategy is small-n comparison, 
following principles laid down by Mahoney (2000) and Brady and Collier (2010).37 Causal 
inference is based on a combination of nominal comparison (analyzing content from news 
providers that are broadly similar, but differ on the key independent variable of having a 
Russian shareholder or partner) and within-case analysis (interviewing editors and journalists 
from each news provider who explain the decision-making behind their news coverage of 
Russia).38 
The content analysis uses a five-week sample of news from 2010.39 Simple quantitative content 
analysis was used to explore variation in the scale of coverage which each news provider 
devoted to Russia: stories containing three or more Russia-related keywords were coded as 
‘featuring Russia’, then for each news provider the proportion of total stories ‘featuring Russia’ 
was calculated. Qualitative content analysis was then used to identify variation in the tone of 
news ‘featuring Russia’. Tone of coverage was assessed through comparison of the news 
providers’ story selection and their reporting of the biggest Russia-related event of the sample 
period – a visit to Ukraine by Patriarch Kirill, the Patriarch of Moscow and All Rus. In this article 
the content analysis findings are summarized only briefly due to space limitations. 
The interviews with editors and journalists were conducted by the author in Moscow (12) and 
Kyiv (16) during 2011. The choice of interviewees was guided first and foremost by the aim of 
speaking to at least one representative from each newspaper and TV news bulletin. Editors-in-
chief or editors/journalists responsible for international and political news reporting were 
preferred.40 In the case of news providers with Russian partners and shareholders, 
representatives from Moscow-based head offices were also approached. In general, there was a 
high level of willingness to participate in the research. The only news provider for which no 
interview could be obtained was Vremya. 
NEWS COVERAGE OF RUSSIA IN RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE TV BULLETINS 
The scale of coverage devoted to Russia by Vremya, Podrobnosti and Sobytia was found to vary 
in line with the hypothesis. On average, 85 per cent of Vremya stories (on Russian state-owned 
Pervyy Kanal) were coded as ‘featuring Russia’, against 11 per cent of Podrobnosti stories (on 
Inter, which has a minority Russian shareholder) and just 5 per cent of Sobytiya stories (on 
Ukraina, which has no Russian shareholder). 
The tone of Vremya’s coverage of Russia was also in line with expectations. Vremya bulletins 
were dominated by uncritical reporting of the daily activity of (then) President Dmitriy 
Medvedev and (then) Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. In contrast, Sobytiya and Podrobnosti 
showed only a handful of reports in which Medvedev and Putin figured; they did not broadcast 
any reports in which the Russian leaders dominated proceedings. 
The stories selected by Podrobnosti and Sobytiya presented Russia in a mixed light. It is notable 
that both these bulletins, unlike Vremya, ran news about a Strategy 31 demonstration in 
Moscow staged by the anti-Kremlin opposition. Podrobnosti reported from the scene of the 
protest and interviewed demonstrators, thus highlighting problems with human rights in 
Russia. Sobytiya showed footage of a ‘sympathy’ protest held outside the Russian embassy in 
Kyiv. 
On the other hand, Podrobnosti regularly broadcast reports which looked back nostalgically to 
the Soviet era and beyond. For example, it ran lengthy features to mark the anniversaries of the 
Tu-104 passenger jet’s first flight (‘the pride of the Soviet Union’), the first joint US-Soviet space 
mission and the death of Soviet bard Vladimir Vysotskiy. One might argue that such reports are 
favorable from Russia’s point of view because they emphasize the positive side of its historical 
relationship with Ukraine. There were no such historical or nostalgic stories on Sobytia. Sobytia 
was more inclined to run quirky or slightly absurd stories from Russia, such as news about a 
Canadian model on Chechen TV and an anti-ageing pill invented in Russia. 
Podrobnosti paid considerably more attention to Russian-Ukrainian relations than either 
Sobytiya or Vremya. It was the only bulletin to report any news about bilateral economic ties 
during the sample period and its reports stressed the importance of the Russian market to 
Ukrainian businesses. Yet Russia was not always portrayed as a benign economic partner. A 
Russian ban on Ukrainian dairy produce was described by Podrobnosti’s correspondent as a 
‘milk war’ and the ‘political character’ of Russia’s actions was made quite clear. 
Podrobnosti and Sobytia differed most noticeably in their reporting about Patriarch Kirill’s visit 
to Ukraine. Like Vremya, Podrobnosti completely ignored the tensions surrounding Kirill’s 
presence in Kyiv. It made no mention of the noisy anti-Kirill protests or the police deployed to 
keep order. Sobytiya did report these details; it was also the only bulletin to inform viewers that 
thousands of Orthodox believers had joined a procession led by Patriarch Filaret of the rival 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) instead of that led by Patriarch Kirill. Like 
Vremya, Podrobnosti did not broadcast footage of anyone expressing opposition to Kirill’s visit. 
Sobytiya, on the other hand, showed clips of interviews with Patriarch Filaret of the Kyiv 
Patriarchate, as well as both pro-Kirill and anti-Kirill members of the public. 
To explore the reasons for these findings, interviews were conducted with editorial staff from 
Podrobnosti and Sobytiya (interview requests sent to Vremya went unanswered). 
The difference in scale of reporting about Russia on Podrobnosti and Sobytiya appeared to stem, 
first and foremost, from the level of resources which each program had at its disposal, rather 
than Podrobnosti’s Russian minority shareholder. At Ukraina’s news studio in Kyiv, a senior 
editorial figure complained: 
‘They [Inter] have huge resources. In Kyiv alone they have 40 correspondents... We 
have 12 people here. They have a news bureau in Moscow, so it’s easy for them to 
send culture over from Moscow. If there is some Russian-Ukrainian exhibition 
there, they will surely run a story on it. But we cannot.’ 
Another reason for Sobytiya’s relatively limited Russia coverage was the length of the bulletin; it 
was only 20 minutes long against Podrobnosti’s 30 minutes. 
The prevalence of ‘nostalgic’ stories featuring Russia in Podrobnosti bulletins was linked to the 
interests of Inter’s viewers. When asked to describe the kind of stories which attracted his 
attention, a Podrobnosti journalist said: 
‘The first thing that interests us is everything connected to Ukraine... The second 
point is anything which may simply be interesting to Ukrainian viewers... For 
example, there was a festival of Soviet advertising in Moscow... Ukraine was part of 
the Soviet Union, it’s only been independent for 20 years, so many people there still 
remember those times and the Soviet Union, it will be interesting for them to get 
nostalgic and remember. Familiar people and actors, familiar Aeroflot, familiar 
Soviet sparkling wine being advertised. Adverts for familiar Zhiguli or Zaporozhets 
[cars]. Maybe they never saw the ads [originally], but it will be interesting for them 
to watch because it’s their youth.’ 
At Ukraina, on the hand, more weight was given to infotainment-type criteria. An Ukraina 
journalist said: 
‘In journalism there is a thing known as the six Ss and one D. Have you heard of it? 
They are the hooks which hold a viewer and rivet attention to the news. What is 
news? News is information which contains something from the six Ss and one D. 
What are the six Ss? Fear [strakh], death [smert], sex [seks], scandal [skandal]. What 
else was there? Laughter [smekh] and something else… D is for money [dengi]. 
Anything that doesn’t fall into those categories isn’t news. Because it’s a minus, it 
misses the cash till. It’s propaganda.’ 
The same interviewee suggested that some content differences between Podrobnosti and 
Sobytiya could be explained by their different target audiences: 
‘[At Inter] it’s about old ladies over 50. They are deliberately working for [an 
audience of] grannies. That’s their contingent... In general, we [at Ukraina] are 
working for a commercial audience – 18 to 45 year olds.’ 
During the interviews, questions were asked about the influence of media owners on reporting 
about Russia. Of course, owner influence is a topic which editorial staff may be reluctant to 
discuss openly. However, the interviewees’ responses suggested that Podrobnosti and Sobytiya 
journalists could report Russian domestic affairs without much pressure from above, provided 
there was no Ukrainian angle to the story. Witness the following exchange between two senior 
members of the editorial staff at Ukraina: 
First interviewee: ‘The only limit on editorial policy is not to harm the company’s 
interests.’ 
Interviewer: ‘Since his [Akhmetov’s] interests are concentrated in Ukraine, does it 
concern international issues? Can you talk about other countries without worrying?’ 
Second interviewee: ‘We can even make a bit of a nuisance of ourselves 
[nemnozhko pokhuliganit].’ 
First interviewee: ‘And that’s what we do.’ 
Interviewer: ‘Last year you reported about Strategy 31. Is that interesting for 
Ukrainians?’ 
Second interviewee: ‘If there is a commotion, if lots of people come out and 
someone gets punched in the face, then it’s interesting. For the most part, anything 
can be written there: Strategy 66, gays against Slavs.’ 
For his part, the Podrobnosti correspondent said he felt free to report ‘a full range of opinion’ 
about Russian political matters. He drew a contrast with the situation at Russian state TV 
channels: 
‘We show the full range of opinion. The full range is missing from the Russian 
federal channels, but we maintain a balance of opinion. Of course, [we report on 
ruling party] United Russia, those who are currently in parliament... But at the same 
time we talk about the political parties which are small... Let’s say [opposition 
activist Boris] Nemtsov, perhaps... [opposition-minded satirist Viktor] 
Shenderovich. [The people] who take an active citizens’ position, people who 
protest against the current regime and believe that these [December 2011 
parliamentary] elections are simply a farce, in principle...’ 
Thus, the interview data corroborated the content analysis finding that Podrobnosti and 
Sobytiya reported anti-Kremlin opposition unlike Vremya, which tended to ignore it. 
The Podrobnosti correspondent completely rejected the notion that Pervyy Kanal’s shareholding 
in Inter had any effect on content. He pointed out that there was no day-to-day cooperation 
between Vremya and Podrobnosti. He also made quite clear that Podrobnosti enjoyed no special 
relationship with the Russian authorities by virtue of its link to Pervyy Kanal. When asked about 
his interaction with the Russian authorities, he said: 
‘They [the Russian authorities] invite [Podrobnosti journalists to media events]. But 
here you have to understand that if you are invited by an official state structure... 
they’ll show you the very best and not how it really is: they’ll paint the fence, change 
the doorknobs, wash the children in school, make the teacher look nice – not how it 
is in reality. What reason do we have for filming that sugar-coated reality? We can 
easily go ourselves and film on another day.’ 
The interviewee insisted that not once during his time at Inter had he been instructed to leave 
out certain information or refrain from asking certain questions. He said that all ‘generally 
accepted standards’ – including ‘balance of opinion, objectivity, not expressing one’s own 
opinion’ – were observed at Podrobnosti. The content analysis findings support his claims where 
coverage of Russian domestic politics is concerned. Yet Podrobnosti’s coverage of Patriarch 
Kirill’s visit to Ukraine was clearly one-sided. Interviewees at Ukraina suggested that Inter’s 
close relationship with the Ukrainian authorities was to blame. They said: 
‘With all respect to colleagues at Inter, Inter has practically turned into a state 
channel... There [in the Ukrainian authorities] they really don’t like additional 
agitation of the situation.’ 
Thus, the interviews, together with certain patterns which emerged from the content analysis 
(i.e. Podrobnosti’s willingness to report anti-Kremlin protests), indicate that the ‘pro-Russian’ 
slant of which Inter had occasionally been accused was more likely due to domestic Ukrainian 
political forces than direct Russian shareholder influence at the channel. 
NEWS COVERAGE OF RUSSIA IN UKRAINE’S RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE PRESS 
Contrary to the hypothesis, news ‘featuring Russia’ in Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine was 
found to be no more extensive than coverage in Fakty and Segodnya. In fact, the mean 
proportion of stories per issue coded as ‘featuring Russia’ was a little lower for Komsomolskaya 
Pravda v Ukraine (14.2 per cent) than Segodnya (15.5 per cent) and Fakty (16 per cent). 
Comparison of these papers’ selection of stories featuring Russia revealed further similarities 
and offered no clear support for the hypothesis. Segodnya, Fakty and Komsomolskaya Pravda v 
Ukraine all took great interest in accidents, criminal activity, ordinary people doing unusual 
things and spy stories. None of the three tabloids displayed much interest in domestic Russian 
politics. Segodnya was the most attentive. It reported a run-in between Putin and the 
opposition-minded Russian rock musician Yuriy Shevchuk; the Strategy 31 protest; a story 
about Russian oligarchs seeking election; and a report about Putin’s cousin getting a top job in a 
bank. Both Segodnya and Fakty picked up on the troubles of (soon to be dismissed) Moscow 
mayor Yuriy Luzhkov. It is hard to identify a single story in Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine 
that dealt with Russian domestic politics. Thus, its story selection in this area might be 
described as uncritical of the Russian state, but not particularly favorable. 
Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine did, however, regularly run stories about Russian-Ukrainian 
economic ties, as did Segodnya. In almost all the economic stories across all three papers Russia 
had the role of a partner rather than a rival or predator. 
None of the papers took a clear-cut editorial stance on matters relating to Russia. Only Segodnya 
had regular opinion columns that mentioned Russia, all of which were written by Oles Buzina. 
Buzina is known for supporting the ‘tri-unity of the Russian people’, i.e. the idea that Russians, 
Ukrainians and Belarusians are one nation. 
It is difficult to argue on the basis of story selection that coverage of Russia in Komsomolskaya 
Pravda v Ukraine was more favorable than coverage of Russia in Segodnya and Fakty. The three 
papers actually demonstrated a similar approach: none of them showed much interest in the 
Russian political situation and Russia tended to feature in their news content as a banal adjacent 
space where Ukrainians have relatives or do business rather than as a malign or benevolent 
geopolitical force. 
Yet the tone of coverage devoted to the patriarch’s visit in Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine did 
have a more pro-Kirill (and by extension, pro-Russian) slant than coverage in Segodnya and 
Fakty. All three daily tabloids gave reasonably detailed accounts of where Kirill went, whom he 
met and what he did. None of them failed entirely to mention the protests and tensions his 
presence prompted. However, Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine was alone in mentioning the 
rose petals scattered at Kirill’s feet by his Ukrainian supporters, the ‘glad shouts’ which 
welcomed Kirill and the cries of ‘our patriarch’ to which he departed. It quoted Kirill more 
extensively than either Segodnya or Fakty and endorsed the detention of Ukrainian nationalist 
protesters. Both Segodnya and Fakty reported the procession of thousands of believers led by 
Patriarch Filaret of the Kyiv Patriarchate, whereas Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine v Ukraine 
ignored it. 
The interviewees were asked to explain their lack of editorializing on Russia-related matters. At 
both Segodnya and Fakty, editorial staff pointed out that an editorially dispassionate position 
was necessary to retain a mass audience in a politically divided country like Ukraine. At Fakty, a 
columnist said: 
‘We consider ourselves a mass [circulation] newspaper. Therefore, we understand 
that we are read by people with different political and religious views. Why should 
we impose our opinion on them? We don’t have that right!’ 
Similarly, at Segodnya an editor said: 
‘Our reader… believes we should not complete the thought at the end of the article. 
We should give him the opportunity to draw a conclusion himself on the basis of the 
facts which we lay out in the article... I consider it a great skill: to be able to lay out 
all the facts so that the conclusion is clear, but you haven’t prescribed it; the reader 
himself draws a conclusion and is proud to be so clever.’ 
However, unlike Fakty, Segodnya did have the regular columnist Oles Buzina who was very 
forthright in his views. When asked how such opinionated material went down with readers, 
the editor said: 
‘If they buy the paper, that means they’re OK with it. Obviously, our society is split 
in two halves due to all these political [changes tack]. So we are read by the half 
which is closer [to the views expressed in Buzina’s columns]. But in general, we try 
to be objective.’ 
At Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine interviews revealed a need to balance mass audience 
preferences with the expectations of the paper’s Russian franchisor. When asked how the paper 
covered Russian-Ukrainian relations, a correspondent said: 
‘That’s probably the most complicated moment. There are a lot of underwater 
currents here. Here, one has to be extremely careful [akkuratnyy] in one’s 
conclusions and assessments... When you write about this, you have to take into 
account that Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine represents the point of view of the 
majority of people living in Ukraine, after all. The federal Russian paper exactly 
represents the point of view of the majority of Russians.’ 
She went on to say: 
‘A journalist who tries to analyze the situation linked to Ukraine’s political relations, 
certain economic conflicts, he risks falling towards one side... Staying on the line and 
balancing is the hardest thing... Sometimes one has to step on the throat of one’s 
own political impressions of what’s correct and what’s incorrect... In my view, 
Ukraine is being violated here, but I have to find certain arguments so that the other 
side’s point of view is also represented.’ 
The presence of a Russian franchisor clearly affected coverage of Russian-Ukrainian relations in 
Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine, but editorial stance did not appear to be explicitly dictated 
from Moscow. Rather, the correspondent’s comments suggested that the paper generally ended 
up acknowledging any obvious tensions, but playing down their significance: 
‘It would be very strange if the Ukrainian editorial office, knowing the mood of 
people in Ukraine, started to pursue the line which is close to the federal Moscow 
editorial office. We have to reflect the situation we live in. We have to take into 
account the opinion of our readers and the majority of citizens... When there are 
two opinions on one page, the compromise solution in that situation is [to include] 
some comments by pundits, who say that this is all normal, in fact. There are two 
points of view and there is no solution other than to look for some points of 
common ground.’ 
The problem of balancing between reader and franchisor expectations was also raised by an 
editor interviewed at Argumenty i Fakty v Ukraine. Content analysis indicated that latter 
publication took a muted editorial stance on Russia. For instance, its coverage of Patriarch 
Kirill’s visit consisted of just one small article based on a letter from a reader. The reader 
observed that ‘many arguments’ surrounded the patriarch’s visit, and asked whether it was 
‘really another lever of Moscow’s pressure on Kyiv’. AiF v Ukraine reassured her that ‘despite 
protests by right-wing forces’, Kirill’s visit had not been ‘marred by unpleasantness’. The senior 
editorial figure at AiF v Ukraine explained her paper’s approach to this story as follows: 
‘When he [Kirill] arrived for the very first time, there was very great public and 
reader interest towards him and we ran reports about it several times... Later we 
reduced the share of this news, because it became clear that there is not just 
religion here, there is politics here too. And in order not to provoke any kind of 
irritation in the reader once again [we reduced coverage]... The same with Putin. 
Yes, the event happens, but we don’t stress it... If we were not the main publication 
in Moscow we could allow ourselves more.’ 
The interviewee said that AiF v Ukraine tried not to ‘irritate’ its readers or trigger reproaches for 
being ‘pro-Russian’. These prerogatives were borne in mind when republishing material from 
the Russian federal edition. 
A couple of missing issues made it impossible to compare accurately the scale of coverage 
devoted to Russia by the weeklies. However, contrary to the hypothesis, the tone of Russia 
coverage in AiF v Ukraine was not visibly more favorable than the tone of coverage in 2000, 
Zerkalo Nedeli, Stolichnyye Novosti and Kommentarii. In fact, AiF v Ukraine was often gently 
skeptical about the system of authority in Russia. A regular column on its second page took 
quotes from prominent public figures – Russian ministers and MPs – and followed each one 
with a mocking editorial response. One example from 22 September ran: 
‘S. Markov, State Duma deputy: “Back then (in the 1990s – ed.) it was not so much 
liberals who were governing as traitors or absolutely unqualified thieves.” – Clear 
progress is apparent in the Russian state! In terms of their level of qualification, the 
thieves of those days were not a patch on today’s lot.’ 
One cannot qualify this mild derision as criticism, but it does subvert the official version of 
Russian politics promoted by the likes of Vremya. 
The most unambiguously ‘pro-Russian’ weekly was 2000 (another publication which recently 
shut down).41 Its proprietor and editor-in-chief Sergey Kichigin is on record as saying: ‘In every 
way we [at 2000] have advocated and are advocating friendship with Russia’.42 This was very 
much reflected in its story selection. For example, it ran a lengthy interview with Konstantin 
Zatulin in which the Russian MP expounded views for which is well known: he called for the 
closest possible ties between Russia and Ukraine; reiterated that Ukrainians were ‘Russians 
who live on the periphery [s krayu]’; and argued that not enough was being done to preserve 
the ‘single Russian-Ukrainian cultural and spiritual space’. 
Story selection in Zerkalo Nedeli, Kommentarii and Stolichnyye Novosti was less indicative of a 
particular editorial viewpoint on Russia. In Stolichnyye Novosti, opinion-based articles were 
often set up to contrast opposing points of view about Russia on the same page. For its part, 
Kommentarii focused heavily on the economic aspect of bilateral relations and frequently 
mentioned Russia without making any value judgments. On occasion it highlighted advantages 
to Ukraine of doing business with Russia, but the message that Russian and Ukrainian economic 
interests are essentially at odds was often visible. For instance, Kommentarii columnist Andrey 
Starostin wrote on 4 June: 
‘The Ukrainian authorities, and above all big business, are hinting that they won’t 
surrender anything else without a fight. The Russians are inquiring after the price 
and waiting until the Ukrainians run to them by virtue of the most varied reasons.’ 
Zerkalo Nedeli was somewhat similar to Kommentarii in that there was no outright editorial 
hostility towards Russia evident in its story selection, but several suggestions that Russia’s 
influence was something of which Ukraine should be wary. 
The flattering coverage of Russia in 2000 can be traced back to views expressed by the editor-
proprietor. Precisely why he holds those views is less clear (it may be relevant to note that 
Kichigin is reportedly a former KGB counter-propaganda officer). Yet the editorial policy 
established at 2000 attracted a readership whose views corresponded to those of the owner, so 
journalists wrote to please both their readers and their editor simultaneously. A journalist from 
the paper explained: 
‘I am free to develop any topics from any angle. But perhaps I always write with 
reference to the fact that I understand the kind of audience which reads us: 2000 
readers, it seems to me and I’m certain I’m right, are people of strongly pro-Russian 
views, perhaps even strongly nostalgic for the Soviet past. And probably when I 
write, I understand that in the back of my mind and therefore I try not to write too 
sharply about certain obvious things.’ 
The interviewee herself did not particularly identify with the position she attributes to her 
readers. At one point she observed: ‘Journalists look at their work with sarcasm. It’s just work.’ 
A situation of mutually reinforcing influences, albeit with a very different content outcome, was 
found to exist at the analytical weeklies Zerkalo Nedeli, Kommentarii and Stolichnyye Novosti. 
Journalists from these papers all stressed that they were trying to help decision-makers make 
good decisions. When they wrote about Russia as a threat, they did so because they perceived it 
to be so themselves, because their editors agreed with them, and because they believed reports 
discussing the Russian threat were in the interest of their readers. Thus, one journalist from 
Zerkalo Nedeli explained: 
‘There are things which need to be spoken about, for example, issues of security... 
Ukraine has declared itself an independent state. How should Ukraine ensure its 
security in this situation?... It’s a very practical question to which the Ukrainian 
authorities are paying no attention. An example in fact: the Black Sea Fleet. Does it 
present a risk to Ukraine’s security? In my view, yes.’ 
Interviewees from all three papers indicated that the perception of Russia as a threat was quite 
widespread among their colleagues and that these personal views affected the tone of reporting. 
There was no evidence of regular or inherent conflict between what the journalists wanted to 
write about Russia and the principles or boundaries imposed by owners and managers. At 
Zerkalo Nedeli journalists sometimes negotiated over stories with the editor-in-chief; the 
interviewee explained: 
‘In our case, the editor-in-chief – the person who supervises the creative process – 
is also the owner, the co-owner. Therefore everything depends on whether you 
can convince [him]. Sometimes you don’t convince [him]. Sometimes you go away 
and you are wrong, but this is decided each time in an individual way.’ 
The Kommentarii interviewee indicated that the owner’s influence was fairly light and tended to 
concern reporting of certain domestic topics more than international affairs. The Stolichnyye 
Novosti journalist stated that he, too, had experienced only localized owner pressure. He 
observed that the paper’s proprietor (Ihor Kolomoyskyy) had other more significant media to 
worry about, such as the TV channel 1+1. 
As for the daily broadsheets, the content analysis results conformed partially to the hypothesis. 
Izvestiya v Ukraine was found to have extremely extensive Russia coverage, with 47 per cent of 
its stories coded as ‘featuring Russia’. However, Den (26 per cent) had more extensive Russia 
coverage than Russian-owned Kommersant-Ukraina (18 per cent). 
Den and Izvestiya v Ukraine behaved fully in line with the hypothesis in the tone of their 
reporting about Russia. The former ran many reports in which the Russian state was depicted as 
a threat or malefactor. The latter carried a copious amount of uncritical news about the Russian 
authorities. Kommersant-Ukraina took a much more ambiguous editorial stance. References to 
Russia were frequently found in the context of news about trade or energy, but such news 
tended to be reported from an economic perspective, with the geopolitical dimension 
downplayed. Column space was divided fairly evenly between the positive and negative sides of 
the Russian-Ukrainian economic relationship. In stark contrast to Den and Izvestiya v Ukraine, 
Kommersant-Ukraina carried almost no editorial comment. Thus, when reporting Patriarch 
Kirill’s visit, Kommersant-Ukraina journalists drew no conclusions of their own. Instead, they 
conveyed the views of a wide range of interviewees encompassing politicians (from opposing 
camps), political scientists (from opposing schools of thought) and both patriarchates of the 
Ukrainian Orthodox church. Meanwhile, Izvestiya v Ukraine’s coverage of the visit read like an 
official itinerary. It reported that a handful of believers had sailed the length of the Dnipro River 
to symbolize the ‘unity of holy Rus’, yet the fact that several thousands of believers had joined 
the Kyiv Patriarchate’s procession instead of following Kirill was omitted. In Izvestiya v Ukraine, 
most statements of opinion came from Kirill himself. The only opposing opinions it quoted were 
a couple of nationalist slogans, which were clearly labelled by the reporter as ‘insulting’ and 
belonging to a ‘miserly’ small group of extremists. Den, for its part, described Kirill as the ‘main 
church hierarch of the empire’ and its reporter complained: ‘The attack on democratic and 
independent Ukraine is clearly not weakening.’ 
When asked why Kommersant-Ukraina did not take an editorial stand of its own, one journalist 
interviewed described the policy as a marketing strategy: 
‘There is a rule: analysis is not encouraged at our paper. There is a fear that it won’t 
be objective. In other words, we are supposed to lay out the facts... When 
Kommersant moved over here, there was too much subjective opinion everywhere. 
Kommersant decided that we should differ in some way, there had to be a unique 
selling point [fishka]. [Our unique selling point is that] we don’t write opinion, we 
write news.’ 
In fact, this rule that journalists should not explicitly express their own views in print was one of 
the main constraints imposed by the Moscow editorial office on their Kyiv colleagues. A senior 
Kommersant manager in Moscow explained: ‘They don’t have the opportunity to put in 
something that we have not checked’; editorial staff in Moscow exercised rigorous control over 
the tone and quality of material published by Kommersant-Ukraina. However, in matters of 
substance the Moscow editorial team allowed their counterparts in Kyiv leeway. One 
Kommersant-Ukraina journalist said: 
‘If they have written that it is so, but we understand that it is not quite so, we have 
the right to write it differently. They [Kommersant in Moscow] do not control us in 
that respect.’ 
This interviewee acknowledged that Kommersant-Ukraina was ‘accustomed’ to being viewed as 
Russian and sometimes accused of writing with a pro-Russian slant. ‘It’s impossible to avoid – 
we are a Russian publication,’ he said. Yet he pointed out that ‘unpleasant’ things were printed 
about Russia in Kommersant-Ukraina, things ‘which Russia would not like to see’. He attributed 
this to the paper’s business audience, noting the need for businesspeople to be aware of 
opposition to the Kremlin. He gave no indication of having to balance the interests of Ukrainian 
readers against those of Russian colleagues or owners. As for Alisher Usmanov, the interviewee 
said: 
‘He doesn’t decide anything at our paper. He’s a long way away. And it’s too small an 
asset for him to decide anything... He simply has a mega-empire, a global one, so 
Kommersant is just a small project. So for him to call here and decide something – 
it’s just not his level.’ 
The relationship between Izvestiya v Ukraine and its Moscow head office was quite different. 
Editors in Kyiv did not have to get Moscow’s prior approval for the content of each Izvestiya v 
Ukraine issue, but a senior Izvestiya representative in Moscow made clear that certain editorial 
principles had to be observed. He said: 
‘There were people in the leadership of the Ukrainian editorial team, in whom we 
suddenly noticed a certain disdain for the interests of Russia. We did everything so 
that these people first found out about this, put things right, and if they didn’t put 
things right, they left. This is natural, at the end of the day... If we have a certain 
editorial policy, then the editorial policy of the edition in Ukraine, should match 
this.’ 
He added that ‘things which directly violate or distort Russia’s policy towards Ukraine’ could 
not appear in the main body of the newspaper without provoking objections. 
The negative portrayal of Russia observed in Den was first and foremost attributable to 
personal views held by the editorial team, including the journalist interviewed, who was 
responsible for much of the paper’s reporting on Russia. The journalist said he enjoyed a large 
amount of freedom in his selection of stories. He made very clear that he viewed Russia as a 
source of risk, saying: 
‘Even when we write about Russia’s domestic affairs, we have Ukraine in mind. 
First, for obvious reasons, many processes that happen in Russia also happen in 
Ukraine in another form, or similar. Or a danger arises – I call it a virus infection – a 
danger of that infection being carried in from there. For example, we are very 
interested in the ethnic tension in Russia, because we have had direct attempts to 
instil it here. We have had anti-Semitic occurrences. But it is all the work of Russian 
agents...’ 
The interviewee made clear that journalistic neutrality was deliberately rejected at Den in favor 
of promoting what was best for Ukraine in the eyes of the editorial team. He explained: 
‘We are anti-communist, what’s more, a militantly anti-communist newspaper. We 
also take the positions of liberalism and Ukraine’s independence from Russia. In 
other words, we want [Ukraine] to be constructed according to a European pattern. 
We want to be a European country not only geographically... We do indeed adhere 
to a pro-Western course, but exclusively to Ukraine’s advantage.’ 
Quite why Den took this forthright approach is unclear; the interviewee said the owner’s 
political views did not make themselves felt at the paper. However, he did note that ‘a lot 
depends on the editor-in-chief’. 
DISCUSSION: RUSSIAN NEWS EXPORTS AND ‘SOFT POWER’ 
The research presented above shows that Russian capital and franchisors affected the view of 
Russia in news consumed by millions of Ukrainians during the period under study, but it also 
shows that their impact on content varied from one news provider to another. Via Vremya and 
Izvestiya v Ukraine Russia was exporting news which portrayed the Russian authorities and 
their policies in a very positive light.43 Komsomolskaya Pravda v Ukraine and Argumenty i Fakty v 
Ukraine did not generate such regular and extensive flattery for the Russian state; the latter 
even gently mocked Russia’s political establishment. Yet both tabloids were inclined to play 
down bilateral tensions as editors balanced the expectations of Russian colleagues against the 
need to appeal to a mass Ukrainian audience. Kommersant-Ukraina wrote about Russia’s 
democratic deficit, but it did so in a very matter-of-fact way, without obvious editorializing, 
because such was the policy imposed by its parent publication in Moscow. Only at Podrobnosti 
was the presence of a Russian shareholder found to have little discernible effect on Russia 
coverage. Pervyy Kanal’s minority stake in Inter apparently had negligible impact on the latter’s 
editorial policy, which owed more to Ukrainian state influence on the channel during the period 
under study. 
This diversity and vulnerability to local influences among the ‘Russian’ media in Ukraine is 
obscured when such media are viewed exclusively through the lens of soft power. The soft 
power framework fosters an overly simplistic interpretation of Russian transnational media 
activity, where state interests are overemphasized and other explanatory factors risk being 
overlooked. 
There are grounds to be cautious about applying the ‘soft power’ label even in the case of 
unambiguously pro-Kremlin news exporters. From time to time, Russian TV channels generate 
political scandals in Ukraine which fit uneasily with the idea of eliciting positive attraction. A 
notable documentary shown on Rossiya/RTR-Planeta in March 2006 claimed that a CIA prison 
existed outside Kyiv.44 Another on Pervyy Kanal, titled Oranzhevyye deti tretyego reykha (Orange 
children of the Third Reich) suggested in February 2010 that the Orange revolution had been 
staged by second-generation Nazis with assistance from the USA.45 In 2008 Vremya seized on a 
report (which originated in the Ukrainian press) about the sale of Hitler dolls in Kyiv, 
embellishing the story with untrue claims that the doll had become a ‘hit’ among customers.46 
More recently, the reluctance of President Yanukovych to sign Ukraine up as a full Customs 
Union member prompted a Russian media offensive against him and his policies.47 Such Russian 
‘information attacks’ sparked outrage in Kyiv, even though relatively few Ukrainians actually 
saw the offending content when it was first broadcast. As explained above, Russian TV channels 
have not had a particularly large audience share in Ukraine in recent years. Yet ‘information 
attacks’ by Russia have become news stories in their own right as they have been reported by 
domestic news providers, posted on YouTube and vocally criticized by politicians, journalists 
and other public figures.  
In fact, Russian news does not even need to be deliberately exported by Russian broadcasters in 
order to resonate across the border. In March 2013 a local TV station in Russia’s Orenburg ran a 
report about Taras Shevchenko, in which the revered Ukrainian poet was described as a 
Russophobe and linked to Nazi propaganda. The report was only broadcast in the Orenburg 
region. Yet it was spotted by Ukrainians living in Russia and subsequently received widespread 
coverage in the Ukrainian media.48 
It remains an open question whether benefits accrued by the Kremlin from Russian media 
‘attracting’ foreign audiences outweigh the problems caused by Russian media’s power to 
provoke. This is an issue which future research should investigate. In the meantime, the soft 
power framework should be applied with caution. Indiscriminate generalizations about the 
‘Russian’ media in Ukraine and assumptions that they facilitate Russian foreign policy success 
are problematic. Rather than soft power, we might use the metaphor of a Soviet-era communal 
apartment with very thin walls. When Russia talks about its neighbors it tends to be overheard 
and the neighbors inevitably react. Yet the thin walls are not necessarily an advantage for 
Russia. To date there is little firm evidence to suggest that Russia’s audibility has made its life in 
the apartment easier – and some episodes indicate that quite the reverse is true. 
POSTSCRIPT 
This article was completed in October 2013, before the mass protests of ‘EuroMaidan’, the 
ousting of President Yanukovych and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The crisis has put the 
Russian presence in Ukraine’s news media landscape into a state of flux: cable transmissions of 
Russia’s main federal broadcasters have been banned by the new Ukrainian government in the 
interests of ‘information security’;49 Kommersant-Ukraina has ceased publication. Meanwhile, 
the issue of Russian TV ‘propaganda’ has hit center-stage.50 The recent turbulent period 
arguably underlines the inadequacy of the ‘soft power’ framework to capture the nature of 
Russia’s transnational media activity and its significance for relations between Moscow and 
Kyiv. Softly ‘eliciting attraction’ has been a far lower priority in the Kremlin’s information 
strategy than discrediting the new Ukrainian authorities. 
During the crisis, some journalists have written about Russian channels being ‘widely watched’ 
in Ukraine and playing a ‘crucial’ role.51 Such statements need to be treated cautiously. The 
Russian propaganda campaign has undoubtedly made political waves, but this may be due to its 
highly aggressive nature and apparent effectiveness in Russia more than a high proportion of 
Ukrainians tuning in and taking its claims at face value. As this article has pointed out, the best 
available data suggest that Russian TV news has been less widely watched in Ukraine in recent 
years than widely available. Most Ukrainians prefer to get their information about current 
affairs from domestic channels – which have been reporting the Russian propaganda campaign 
critically, as a news story in its own right, and exposing elements of disinformation.52 Across 
Ukraine, the persuasive power of Russian TV news may have been restricted by other, more 
popular sources contradicting its messages. The ‘power’ of Russian TV news during recent 
Ukrainian events would in that case be polarizing more than persuasive, stemming from its 
capacity to deepen divisions between a smaller section of the population who are convinced and 
a larger section who are offended. Further research into the matter is undoubtedly needed 
before firm conclusions can be drawn. 
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